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Abstract: 
As practical knowledge seems to have a central place in organisational issues, we focus on 
possibilities to study and formalize it.  From an unusual theoretical perspective, we view 
practical knowledge as embodied knowing which only is only manifest through action in a 
particular situation.  Although this knowledge is largely implicit, we try to make what is 
‘articulable’ explicit.  After highlighting the stakes involved in the codification of practices, 
we review the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying the method developed.  
It is founded on participant observation, a video recording of a situated subjective perspective 
and an ex post interview using this perspective to aid an actor to make part of his/her practical 
knowledge explicit.  We present its implementation within research on polar expeditions in 
order to understand how an experienced actor deals with risks.  In conclusion, we point out 
(1) the importance of this kind of data in knowledge management, (2) some lines of further 
research.  
 
Key-words: Case study, knowledge management tools, reflective practice, tacit knowledge, 
codification, knowing-in-action 
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Following Polanyi’s theses (1996) and as several other authors have noted (Brown & Duguid 
1991; Cook & Brown 1999; Nonaka & Tackeuchi 1995; Orlikowski 2002; Schön 1983; 
Tsoukas 1996), we have questioned practical knowledge and its central place in organisational 
issues (Foray 2004; Tsoukas 2003).  In spite of the many developments concerning 
knowledge management in different kinds of organisation, there are very few methodological 
propositions to approach knowledge systems and processes (Patriotta 2004).  Without dealing 
with this whole question, we focus on practical knowledge in the context of its production and 
on possibilities to study and formalize it.  In this way, we try to make a methodological 
contribution to knowledge management both for researchers and practitioners.  This 
contribution is rooted in unusual theoretical references:  whereas “Polanyi (1966) is by 
tradition the authoritative source for the concept [of tacit knowledge]” (Gourlay 2006, p.60), 
we refer also to Piaget (1974).  His propositions enable us to view practical knowledge 
differently, its tacitness, and to understand how it can, to some degree, be articulated. 
Practical knowledge is, thus, conceived as “connaissances-en-acte” or knowing-in-action.  
Knowing-in-action is viewed as embodied knowing which only manifests itself in by, and 
during action in a particular situation.  Although this knowledge is largely implicit, we try, 
through the method, to make what is ‘articulable’ explicit (Yanow & Tsoukas 2007, p.10).  In 
this way, following Vermersch’s phenomenological perspective (1999a, 2003), we attempt to 
approach the actor’s own situated perspective.  
After highlighting the stakes involved in the codification of practices, we review the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions of the method.  Then, we present the conditions 
of its implementation.  What follows next is an empirical example, adaptation practices in a 
polar expedition, in order to illustrate the method.  In conclusion, we highlight on the one 
hand, the importance and the use of this kind of data in knowledge management, on the other, 
we point out the limits of such results and directions of further research.  
 
Knowledge management and challenges of codification of practices 
The codification of practices begins with writing. According to Goody (1977), this operation 
expresses a society's will to make up for the weaknesses and uncertainties of human memory 
with the aim of storing knowledge, perceived as a learning program.  But writing also has 
cognitive effects on society, by developing capacities for abstraction and the critical function, 
which play a specific role in encouraging new knowledge production.  This operation takes on 
a particular value today in relation to the emergence of a knowledge-based economy (Foray 
2004).  The key factors for the success of companies and national economies are more than 
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ever dependent on their capacities to produce and use knowledge.  Since the main source of 
this knowledge is tacit –as the concept of “tacit knowledge” carries many meanings (Gourlay 
2006), we later explain how we define it–, the problem of codification becomes vital in 
economic terms.  In effect, codification makes it possible to detach knowledge from the 
person who possesses it (Myers, in Gourlay 2006).  It involves a fixed cost –that of expressing 
the knowledge in a language and its recording on a support– but then seems to increase the 
efficiency of a whole series of knowledge management operations: memorization, 
distribution, learning.  Once a formula has been written, which may represent a significant 
fixed cost, it may then be communicated at a negligible marginal cost.  In the management 
field, Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) have identified a key stage in the spiral of organisational 
knowledge creation, the spearhead of Japanese company performance: the stage known as 
externalization. It consists of the passage from tacit knowing to explicit knowledge.  The 
codification of tacit knowing has become a challenge for both economists and managers.  At 
the same time, it is a complex operation, due to the very nature of tacit knowing, which it still 
seems impossible to reduce to a codification operation.  In addition, the codification process 
can never supply all the knowledge necessary to undertake an action.  
In pragmatic terms, companies that have undertaken knowledge management have found this 
problem a stumbling block at some point in the process.  Two ways of envisaging knowledge 
management, two kinds of knowledge management strategies have been identified (Hansen et 
al. 1999): a codification strategy where knowledge is codified and stored in databases, and a 
personalization strategy where personal interaction is essential.  These two forms of 
knowledge management reflect different visions of the organisation –on the one hand, the 
paradigm of Herbert Simon's information processing system, and on the other, the community 
of practice of Lave & Wenger.  The first is based on a conception of knowledge management  
in information system terms, a cognitivist vision:  we can take the image of a physical 
platform for storage of information; the second treats knowledge management in terms of the 
management of human resources, a communitarist vision:  we can take the image of the social 
network.  The codification operation is as essential to the first strategy as it is negligible or 
even non-existent in the second.  Rather than completely contrasting these two forms of 
management, many authors try to combine them.  We may well ask whether we are not 
actually in the presence of two socio-technical configurations (Latour 2005), that we must 
describe effectively:  what is a data warehouse without the people who use it?  What is a 
social network that operates without any physical support ?  The operation of codification 
takes different forms, depending on the socio-technical pairing modes applied.  Lastly, we can 
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envisage within a community of practice that mentoring between an expert and a novice is 
based, at a given moment in time, on the expert's expression of his/her practice, taking the 
form of a written discourse which the novice will use as a support within the framework of 
his/her learning.  
As the codification of practices seems to become a knowledge management tool, we have 
developed a method in order to study and formalize knowing-in-action.  
 
Methodological presuppositions 
In order to outline how we try to study and formalize practical knowledge, it is necessary to 
specify several postulates underlying the method.  First, we claim that practice is embedded in 
its context. Referring particularly to the ethnomethodological theses of Garfinkel (1967) and 
of De Fornel & Quéré (1999), to the notions of situated action (Suchman 1987), and of 
distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995), we assert that action is not dissociable from situation, 
nor from cognition: it is impossible to understand the practice outside of its local setting.  As 
suggested by Suchman (1987) and Orr (1996), we must study effective and singular actions, 
their courses in a particular physical and human framework, and what underlies each one.  
Generic principles, if needed, are established, a posteriori, by the researcher from work 
previously carried out on different actions which have been undertaken and understood as 
such  Consequently, the studies are not directly aiming for generalities or rules that actors 
produce to account for their usual activity.  Yet, ‘as several anthropologists, including 
Suchman (1987) and Bourdieu (1972) point out, "informants" often describe their jobs in 
canonical terms though they carry them out in non-canonical knowledge’ (Brown & Duguid 
1991, p 42).  In the tradition of ethnological research, activity is thus apprehended in a usual 
situation, in the way it was done, and in its singularity – and not only through the actor’s 
discourse. The fact of not experiencing the practice directly hinders the study (Orlikowski 
2002).  The practice is thus studied in its ordinary context (Garfinkel 1967).  We are not 
concerned here with denying that the researcher participates in the situation which he/she 
studies – it is for this reason that we do not use the term natural.  Rather, we point out that the 
researcher is interested in an actual activity, not in an experimental framework, and in the 
usual life context of the actors concerned, which is set apart from the presence of the 
researcher.  We therefore describe an ordinary as opposed to an extra-ordinary context which 
strays from what the actors are confronted with in a routine situation. 
The second postulate breaks with the ethnomethodological theses discussed above and 
those of Bourdieu (1972).  For us, understanding a practice cannot be limited to the 
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observation of behaviour, but presupposes the understanding of significant underlying facets.  
From a phenomenological perspective, Vermersch (2004, p.36) provides a quote that 
enlightens our understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s The Structure of Behaviour (1942): action 
seems to be ‘a double-sided object, one public and behaviourally observable, the other 
private and non-observable’.  Exterior observation is neither sufficient to account for, nor to 
explain the actor’s activity.  It is important to consider his/her particular way of living, of 
perceiving, of making sense of his/her situation… to consider his/her own world.  
Approaching the subjective side of the practice enables us to study such practice.  The 
difficulty lies in the fact that the subjective side of practice stems from an embodied meaning, 
from ‘significant real-life sets’ (Merleau-Ponty 1942, p.179), from knowing-in-action (Piaget 
1974), and from cognition embedded in practice (Yanow & Tsoukas 2007).  Practice ‘conveys 
an ante-predicative prelinguistic meaning’ (Dauliach 1998, p.309), similar to ‘pre-reflected 
awareness’ (Vermersch 2003, p.71) or in Polanyi’s words, a kind of subsidiary awareness.  
According to Taylor, Yanow & Tsoukas (2007, p.10) point out that ‘[M]uch of our intelligent 
action in the world is carried on unformulated. It flows from an understanding which is 
largely inarticulate’.  In spite of its unarticulated nature, it is important to address these 
constituents.  
The third postulate concerns the actor: he/she is considered to be a reflective 
practitioner (Schön 1983).  He/she is endowed with the possibility of recognising his/her own 
activity from a new perspective.  The phenomenological premises underlining ‘the power the 
subject has to set sights on himself/herself’ (Merleau-Ponty 1988, p.408) establish the 
possibilities the actor has to explicate his/her experience (Dauliach 1998; Vermersch 2003, 
2004).  In other words, ‘humans have the capacity to reflect on what they do and to articulate 
those reflections’ (Yanow & Tsoukas 2007, p.15).  However, the actor is not spontaneously 
able to update it: to become aware of his/her own subjective experience, ‘its descriptive 
thematisation, and even prior to all that, its deliberate reflection are not spontaneous, nor 
immediate, nor direct, nor easy!’ (Vermersch 1999b, p.13).  It is difficult ‘to relate to 
something which has not yet become the object of conscious awareness’ (Vermersch 1999a, 
p.34). Many authors who are interested in organisational knowledge, highlight this difficulty 
(c.f., Nonaka & Tackeuchi 1995 or Tsoukas 2003).  ‘The knowledge people use in 
organizations is so practical and deeply familiar to them that when people are asked to 
describe how they do what they do, they often find it hard to express it in words’ (Tsoukas 
2003, p.413).  ‘If the subject wants to be able to produce a description he first has to 
presentify the lived experience which serves as the point of reference and to suspend his usual 
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way of doing things in order that what previously only existed ‘in act’ now appears as object’ 
(Vermersch, 1999a, p.36).  If any actor is capable of reflection, it is not a position that is 
spontaneously adopted towards his/her own action.  It should occur as soon as a surprise 
appears (Schön 1983), when there is a disturbance, an interruption (Patriotta 2004; Yanow & 
Tsoukas 2007), but it can also, as we will see, be encouraged by a method (Theureau 1992; 
Vermersch, 1994).  Usual verbalisations concerning the action stem more often from a 
discourse of rationalisation, or of justification than an explication.  Indeed, as Lahire (2002, 
p.391), following Bourdieu (1972), emphasizes, during social interaction or sociological 
interviews, the actors are led to ‘to talk about themselves and to select in their past the traits 
they judge to be salient’.  Consequently, the discourse produced does not correspond to an 
explication, but is similar to a ‘verbal construction of oneself by oneself [which] is the product 
of narrative work based on the observation of oneself by oneself and by others’ (Lahire 2002, 
p.392).  Informants tend to use abstract knowledge in order to describe their actions (Lave 
1988).  Accordingly, the method developed must constitute an aid to return to, to reflect on, 
the intended action and to verbalize such action.  The method must enable ‘the actor to 
accompany the researcher in what, during the practice, makes sense for former’ (Rix et al. 
2005, p.275).  It must also incite the practitioners ‘to re-view the situation they are in, to 
relate their circumstances in a different way’ (Tsoukas 2003, p.424).  This is done in order to 
inform the researcher what matters. To the extent that ‘focusing on a subsidiary constituent of 
skilful action… changes the character of the activity one is involved with’ (i.e., p.417) and 
disturbs it, this method takes place a posteriori. 
The actor’s return on his/her own activity consummates the passage from an act to a 
linguistic activity about this act.  As Tsoukas (2003) argues, an epistemological break has 
taken place: knowing-in-action and discursive knowledge concerning it are not of the same 
nature.  On one hand, as we have noted, knowing-in-action is only manifested in, by, and 
during action (Quéré 1998).  Hence, their content can be deemed implicit insofar as it is not 
yet articulated.  On the other hand, ‘the activity exists independently of the exchange’, of its 
reflection (Clot 1999, p.152); the discourse concerning it arises from another coupling 
between the actor and his/her environment (Maturana & Varela 1994; Theureau 1992, 2006).  
This new action has its own objective, describing the first one, and its own organisation which 
necessarily introduces a succession, a logical link, between events that, at the time they take 
place, can be more or less identified as distinct phenomena, more or less concomitant, etc.  
Faced with the irreducibility of practice to a discourse, the researcher is confronted with a 
dilemma.  Either he/she resigns him/herself to no longer taking action as a research object 
 8
insofar as all scientific advancement proceeds from a discourse and insofar as practice does 
not need discourse about it in order to be efficient; or, while accepting the action’s 
irreducibility and the impossibility for verbalisations to cover it, he/she tries to understand it 
by interesting him/herself in the relation that the verbalisations of the actor have to his/her 
actions.  This second position is the one we adopt by working, as does Vermersch (1999a, 
p.35), on ‘the controlled employment of reflecting activity’.   
Finally, in order to avoid reducing a theory of action to a theory of a discourse of 
action (Ricoeur 1990), the necessity arises to use different sources of documentation of 
practices.  The last postulate therefore concerns the interest of a triangulation: ‘to understand 
and analyse the course of the action, […] the verbalisations will come to complement the 
information brought by what is observable and the traces of fulfilled action” (Vermersch 
2003, p.19). If our phenomenological orientation leads us to outline the insufficiency of 
observation to understand practice (Céfaï & Depraz 2001), it seems important to criss-cross 
different kinds of data in order to approach embodied and tacit dimensions of practices. 
 
Presentation of the system  
To understand practices in their ordinary contexts, the method is founded on participant 
observation.  This position directly follows Malinowski’s (1944) ethnological methods.  
However, it is important to draw attention to the way that participant observation is 
implemented, and especially to consider the place and role of the researcher.  The researcher 
does not intend to intervene in the actor’s practices and devotes himself/herself to their 
investigation.  If his/her participation in the activity only amounts to observing and following 
it in order to apprehend what is happening, it is not with the intention of covering, in a neutral 
and exhaustive manner, a “given reality”.  Furthermore, as Favret-Saada (1977) demonstrated, 
even the observer who wants to be an outsider, participates in the situation he/she is studying 
both through the way he/she regards it and the consideration the others have for him or her.  
During observation, the researcher stands in the background.  On the one hand, this position 
allows him/her time to observe, to take notes in situ, as well as to implement different 
investigative systems.  On the other hand, it prevents him/her from having to take sides with 
members of the group; in this way, he/she conserves the possibility of sharing a posteriori, 
during an interview, each actor’s own experience without that actor feeling compared to or 
judged in relation to others.  Indeed, insofar as the actors are invited, in turn, by the researcher 
to make their own situated experience explicit, the participant observation must also engender 
the possibility of this kind of exchange.  Once the researcher has made sure that each member 
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of the group participates voluntarily, and accepts both the research and his/her presence, 
participant observation enables him/her to build a trusting relationship with each actor.  This 
trust-building is progressive.  On one hand, the researcher must not jeopardise the project.  On 
the other, the build-up of this trusting relationship depends on the perception that the subjects 
have of the researcher as well as of his/her intentions.  Thus, it seems important to show to 
each person that the objective is in no way to judge or evaluate, but to learn and understand 
his/her practice.  
During this participant observation, the researcher constitutes different types of 
observation data.  Even if, as we have noted, this outside observation is not sufficient, it is 
essential to have, at the end, different kinds of data to document embodied and tacit 
dimensions of practices.  Two kinds of video are recorded at the same time: 
- one corresponds to an outside point of view of the subjects’ activity filmed from a 
broad perspective using a digital video camera (the objective camera); and 
- the other is made using a video camera with a lens (ø 8mm) fixed on the glasses of the 
actor or on an ear piece (the subjective camera), and with a microphone (ø 6mm) 
attached to his/her clothes.  This video camera and microphone are linked to a mini 
DV recorder (73/37/112mm for 340g) that is placed in a coat pocket or on a belt.  This 
set-up enables the recording of the situated subjective perspective of the actor during 
his/her practice.  We do not assimilate this perspective, as do some authors (Lahlou 
1999, 2006), to the actor’s perception, to his/her ‘phenomenal visual and auditory 
flux’ (Lahlou 2006, p.213).  It represents a trace of the activity that is close to the 
actor’s visual field in situ. 
As we have indicated, to understand practices and what is underlying them, it is 
important to approach the implicit, personal, and significant side of the action, beyond these 
traces of the activity.  To that end, and regarding the need to control the reflecting process, we 
designed a system that incites and helps the actor to explicate his/her practices.  In this way, 
several systems have been developed: the explication interview (Vermersch 2003); auto 
confrontation in Von Cranach & Kalbermatten’s work (1982); auto confrontation as part of 
the course-of-action theory (Theureau 1992, 2006); or in a Vygotskyian perspective, a criss-
cross auto confrontation (Clot 1999), and so on.  As far as we are concerned, we use the 
recording of the situated subjective perspective during a subjective re situ interview.  This 
interview takes place as soon as possible after the practice.  It mobilises the situated 
subjective perspective by starting at the beginning of the recording; it begins by requesting the 
actor to talk, in as much detail as possible, about what he/she experienced during the event 
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that the video is showing.  Throughout the interview, watching the video enables the actor to 
be focused, accompanied, and brought as close as possible to the dynamics of his/her actions. 
It, thus, helps him/her to make his/her experience explicit.  Using this video recording as a 
way to support the interview presents the advantage of focusing the dialogue on the singular 
and effective course of a specified practice. It defines a particular occurrence of the activity 
studied by materialising it.  In order to explicate of the action, this perspective seems to 
facilitate the actor’s effort of reflection as much as the conducting of the interview by the 
researcher.  Indeed, the trace interposed between the actor and his/her action, the trace that 
objectifies it, seems close to the way in which he/she actually could have perceived the 
situation in which he/she acted.  Thus, the subjective re situ interview proceeds from ‘a 
double steering of the actor’s reflection, by the recorded trace and the dialectical orientation 
of words’ (Rix & Biache 2004, p.392).  This interview therefore favours a sharing of the 
experience that allows the researcher to understand what makes sense for the actor at the 
moment he/she acts, to approach the subjective side of his/her practice: he/she, ‘by drawing 
our attention to certain things, makes us “see connections”’ (Tsoukas 2003, p.424). 
Three different kinds of data emanate from this system: videos of an actor’s situated 
subjective perspectives during his/her practice, videos of his/her behaviour, and subjective re 
situ interviews.  The first two, once the interview is completed, represent signs of the practice 
in its effective completion; the third one, once transcribed, gives meaning to the practice 
thanks to the actor’s explications.  By taking the actor’s phenomenal experience into account, 
we thus attempt to formalise part of practical knowledge.  
 
An investigation of adaptive practices of an expert polar explorer 
In this third section, we present the way in which this method was set up within a research 
program whose purpose is to study ‘in vivo’, or close-up, an expert’s practices in extreme, 
that is evolving, uncertain, and risky, situations in order to derive theoretical propositions 
(Pettigrew 1990).  Close to Lazarus’s research (1999), we work on the adaptation practices 
that actors use to cope with situations.  The choice of polar expeditions as a research context 
is a result of precise theoretical and methodological concerns that have been addressed in 
other papers and will not be developed here (cf. Lièvre 2004a, 2004b; Lièvre & Rix 2007).  
We should only point out that the nature of this extreme context, paradoxically, greatly 
facilitates the researcher’s work.  The choice of this environment eliminates various problems 
such as the acceptance of the researcher in the field and obstacles related to secrecy and 
confidentiality.  We are not dealing with a private company in cut throat competition, but with 
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groups, without legal status, that bring together voluntary enthusiasts.  The issue of secrecy is 
not viewed in the same way.  Moreover, there is a tradition in polar expeditions, even those 
specifically focused on athletic performance, to integrate a scientific dimension.  The 
researcher’s request is therefore welcomed with pleasure by the actors who quite often solicit 
and demand such participation themselves.  Furthermore, the continuous nature of the activity 
– preparing outings that last several days, expeditions in the field that can last up to two 
months – creates proximity of the researcher and the actors concerned that facilitates trust.  
Finally, in this context, the practical logic of the actors is pushed to its limits that in turn make 
this logic more visible for the researcher. 
As an illustration, we explain how this method was set up during the expedition ‘Nunavut 
2003’ in order to understand the adaptive practices of an expert to cope with extreme 
situations.  In particular, we ask about the way in which risk emerges for him as it happens. 
First of all, we specify the kind of participant observation carried out during the expedition, 
and then discuss the data. 
The researcher joins the team as an person inexperienced in ski polar exploration, as 
an individual who wants to learn others’ practices, and as an observer who follows the group 
wherever it goes and participates in all collective tasks without taking responsibility or 
decisions.  This ethnographic work begins with the idea of the project, continues through the 
different phases of preparation and realisation, and ends with the return home.  In this way, 
the researcher participates in all the activities of the small expedition group.  
During this trek, at different critical phases, the expedition leader, Michel, who, after 
more than 30 years of expeditions, is recognised by his peers as an expert in polar 
expeditions, was equipped with the subjective camera.  The researcher, while walking, filmed 
his behaviour from the side using the objective camera.  The subjective re situ interviews took 
place in France after the trek. 
We present, in a table, the data about a moment of Michel’s progression.  In the first 
column, we describe the context using video recordings of Michel’s behaviour and his 
situated subjective perspective.  The idea is to expose what can be seen and/or heard at that 
moment while limiting the interpretative intrusions.  This description is not intended to be 
exhaustive: it is still possible to clarify Michel’s behaviour and events.  It does, however, 
inform what actually happened, enabling anyone who does not have the videos and did not 
experience this moment of progression, to follow the course of the practice.  In the second 
column, part of the subjective re situ interview about the same moment is re-transcribed; it is 
through this dialogue that the researcher can little by little approach what the explorer 
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experiences, what is significant for him at that moment, what compels him, what affects him, 
what matters to him, etc.  With these different data, we attempt to formalise Michel’s practice 
at that particular moment of progression, while taking into consideration both his experience 
through his explications and what he actually did.  Thus, this formalisation results from a 
synthesis of descriptive data and verbalisations.  It is the researcher’s narrative construction 
which presents the course of Michel’s practice, especially how the situation becomes for him, 
as he progress, risky.  It describes step by step what Michel is doing and what is making sense 
for him as it happens. 
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Table 1 : Illustration of different kinds of data : a formalisation of a practice  
 
Description of the context Explanation of the actor 
We've arrived at the end of a fjord. 
Two team members are walking ahead of Michel; they 
are 50 meters away.  I'm walking on his left slightly 
behind him.   
Michel looks alternately just in front of him, then at the 
right bank that we are walking along. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
He stops and points to the right bank with his stick, and 
as I arrive next to him, he says:  ‘You see, these are 
crappy areas because you can have a bear hiding out 
inside there that suddenly comes out…’ 
Then starting to walk and looking at his fellow team 
members, he continues: ‘That's why I told them to not 
stay in front of the gun, but… They didn't listen to me.’  
He continues to walk towards the end of the fjord and 
looks frequently just in front of him, at the other team 
members and the coast. 
 
  
 
 
Researcher: So, you're looking for something in 
particular…  
Michel: Here, I'm looking at the coast…  
R: For you, there is danger there?  
M: The danger is on the coast… 
R: Ok… Is it a risk, is it danger, what is it at that 
moment?  
M: There is a risk, not in… which is not 
inconsiderable…  I know that at this spot there is a den, 
that there are dens because I've seen them… I know 
there's a seal that got itself killed, I know because there 
are bear tracks… So there are all the indications that 
point to…  
R: So you're telling me that, at that moment, that's what 
really matters? 
M: You see, I'm saying it again…  
R: Does that bother you there?  That they [the other 
team members] didn't listen to you? Are you saying it 
to me again?...  
M: No, it doesn't bother me, but I'm saying, they're 
wrong…  
R: Ok…  
M: You see, I'm saying, that is the kind of crappy area 
for those reasons…  I'm telling them not to do it, to not 
stay in front of me, they stay in front, let them go to 
hell!  
Formalisation of the practice 
At the end of this fjord, Michel knows there are bears: he's already seen dens at this spot.  The tracks in the snow 
and the remains of a seal confirm this possibility. While walking on, he is on the lookout.  A bear can be hidden 
behind a block of ice:  we might see it at the last second, when he charges.  You have to be ready to react.  The 
gun is on Michel's pulka.  For everyone's safety, it's better to stay in a group and behind the gun.  Michel 
mentioned that to everyone, but the others continue to stay in front, which annoys him.  While walking at his 
own pace, he remains attentive.  
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With this kind of data, we are able to work on how the risks associated with the presence of 
bears are actualised during the course of the expert’s practice.  During the moment studied, 
Michel perceived a threat and wanted the members of the expedition to line up behind him as 
a safety measure.  This example allows us to reveal several particular elements that make 
sense for Michel in this situation and which led him to perceive the risk of a bear.  In this 
case, he noted: bear tracks, dens seen during a previous trek, seal remains, geographic layout.  
The emergence of the risk is based on a network of constituents which are only meaningful 
and salient as regards to knowledge, previous experience, and his own involvement.  Even if 
before the trek, Michel planned procedures in order to cope daily with this danger during the 
expedition, for example, protection from the bear during the night, management of the 
group’s progress, and so on, in the real-life situations, this risk was not permanent, it did not 
exist en-soi.  As a result, in reality, more often than not procedures were not followed.   
Firstly, as polar explorers often use other expeditions’ log books in order to prepare and 
succeed in their project, this kind of formalisation of practice could provide an interesting tool 
within this community.  
Secondly, in order to study how risks emerge for expedition leaders and their adaptive 
practices to cope with them, we formalise their practices during several moments. Then, we 
analyse these different formalisations in order to characterise the process during which the 
risk is constructed. We consider foremost:  
-how past experiences contribute to risk determination processes; 
-the sensitivity of the expert which determines how “things are […] encountered […] as 
attractive, threatening, interesting, boring, frustrating, etc” (Dreyfus, in Yanow & Tsoukas 
2007, p.18), for him in one situation at one time;  
-if, when and how the construction of a situation as risky becomes shared by the whole group;  
-places/functions of objects, techniques, planned procedures in this process.  
This kind of analysis allows us, for example, to theorise relationships between previous risks, 
planned procedures, the emergence of risks during the course of the expert’s practice, and 
actions undertaken to cope with the dangers.  It seems to shed new light on the conception and 
management of organisations confronted with extreme situations. 
 
Conclusion  
To conclude, we highlight, firstly, the importance and the use of this kind of data in 
knowledge management; secondly, we point out the limits of such results and directions of 
further researches.  
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The methodology discussed has proved to be an interesting tool to document practical 
knowledge: it enables researchers to understand a posteriori what, in a particular context of 
activity, makes sense for experienced actors.  We conclude by highlighting three reasons why 
this method is of particular interest.  Firstly, this method could also be used by an engineer or 
a manager to gain a better understanding of a particular activity, seeing that several 
researchers (Lalhou 1999; Theureau 2006) have already used a similar method in order to 
study the activity of executives or operators in traditional organisations.  Secondly, as this 
method results in the formalisation of practice, it offers a real opportunity to test the 
usefulness of this kind of description within knowledge management practices.  In effect, in 
order to know if ‘the explicit knowledge created by “tacit knowledge explication” facilitates 
reproduction of the behaviours attributed to tacit knowledge’ (Gourlay 2006, p.65) and how 
this kind of description can be used within knowledge management practices, we have first to 
construct it.  In this way, the methodology discussed is a contribution to knowledge 
management.  Thirdly, these kinds of data allow for the theorisation of relationships between 
prescriptions/plans and the real activity of an expert: it opens up new perspectives on the 
conception and management of organisations, especially those confronted with extreme 
situations.  Moreover, research, close to Berkeley group, on high reliability organisations 
underline the importance of descriptions of effective and situated practices (Bourrier 2001; 
Journé & Raulet-Crozet 2008; Roberts 1990; Weick et al 1999).  
We are only able to touch upon the possibilities for an organisation to use a formalisation of 
practice. Even if, we, like Tsoukas (2003), believe that practical knowledge can neither be 
transferred, nor transmitted directly, this kind of description could constitute a tool within a 
community of practices. Several authors underline also the relevance of narratives in 
knowledge management (cf. Patriotta 2003, 2004). However, in order to evaluate the 
importance and the use of this formalisation of practice within knowledge management, new 
studies are necessary.  Several directions could be developed in order to research the 
relevance of such formalisation in organisations: during a design process (Béguin 2007), 
during more or less formal communications between colleagues or as an artefact for actor 
himself.  Finally, as we focus on the personal characteristics of practical knowledge, another 
line of further research could be the collective side of activity. Insofar as the amount of 
personal practical knowledge is not sufficient to operate an organisation, to understand 
knowledge processes and systems supposes  investigation on a collective scale.  
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